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DON’T JUST MAKE REDISTRICTERS 
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PEOPLE, MAKE THEM THE PEOPLE 
STEVEN F. HUEFNER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The title of this panel, “Is There a Way to Design an Apolitical 
Redistricting Process?,” invites a focus on the question of possibility. 
Of course, a threshold and related question is the desirability of 
having an apolitical redistricting process. Indeed, a rich and expanding 
literature exists about whether or not “independent” redistricting is 
desirable.1 This essay, however, will offer some thoughts primarily 
about the practical possibility of designing an apolitical redistricting 
process, intertwined as that question may be with the question of its 
desirability. 
At the outset it is important to define what “apolitical” 
redistricting means, because in common usage it can signify at least 
two quite different things in this context: (1) redistricting that is not 
allowed to intentionally promote the broader partisan political 
interests of those controlling the redistricting; or (2) redistricting done 
without any awareness of or concern for the partisan political balance 
of the electorate of the resulting districts.2 The first meaning entails a 
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 1. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
593, 600–01 (2002); JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO 
REDISTRICTING 20–22 (2008) (July 1, 2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/ 
a_citizens_guide_to_redistricting/; Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: 
The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
649, 650 (2002). 
 2. It also could take on a third, much broader meaning, describing a redistricting process 
that makes no substantive or policy choices at all. But this essay tracks a common and somewhat 
narrower parlance in which the term is used to connote independence from self-interested 
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sense of neutrality and partisan fairness, in which control over the 
redistricting process is not awarded as a political spoil to a dominant 
party. The second meaning in essence involves redistricting done 
blindly, indifferent to its impact on party strength. 
Almost by definition, the second type of apolitical redistricting, 
done without awareness of partisan demographics, would seem to be 
a subset of the first type of apolitical redistricting, done not 
deliberately to favor partisan interests. But other variants of the first 
type of apolitical redistricting might well take into account in some 
fair way the partisan composition of the resulting districts. Given the 
tendency of Democratic voters to concentrate in urban areas,3 any 
politically “blind” redistricting process that draws districts using some 
traditional redistricting criteria such as compactness in fact may 
produce a set of district maps that is not politically “fair” (depending, 
of course, on what “fair” means).4 
This essay explores possibilities for the first type of apolitical, or 
politically independent, redistricting. In doing so it will also note that 
the second type of apolitical, or politically blind, redistricting, though 
facially attractive to some reformers, is more likely to both generate 
opposition and prove ineffective. In focusing on the prospects for 
apolitical or independent redistricting, this essay addresses the 
substance (or the criteria) and the procedure (or the institution) of an 
apolitical redistricting system. It also addresses the primary 
implementation challenges associated with bringing to fruition 
hypothetical models for an independent redistricting system. This 
“here to there”5 discussion draws lessons from recent ballot measure 
reform efforts in both California and Ohio, now that prospects for a 
judicial approach to taking self-interested partisanship out of 
redistricting seem increasingly remote.6 
 
politicians. 
 3. See Jeanne C. Fromer, An Exercise in Line Drawing: Deriving and Measuring Fairness 
in Redistricting, 93 GEO. L. J. 1547, 1575 (2005) (noting general correlation between urban 
communities and Democratic Party). 
 4. Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Tobler’s Law, Urbanization, and Electoral Bias: Why 
Compact, Contiguous Districts are Bad for the Democrats (Nov. 4, 2009) (unpublished working 
paper), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~jowei/identified.pdf; Daniel H. Lowenstein & 
Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest For Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or 
Illusory?, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (1985). 
 5. Heather Gerken, Getting From Here to There in Election Reform, 34 OK. C. U. L. REV. 
33, 33 (2009). 
 6. Not everyone has given up this fight, even after Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), 
and League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
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The central claim of the essay, running throughout its separate 
discussions of the criteria, processes, and prospects for apolitical 
redistricting, is that the electorate as a whole must feel and possess 
more of an ownership interest in the redistricting system. Indeed, 
recent proposals for redistricting reform have typically foundered 
because opponents have successfully argued that an independent 
redistricting body was, by definition, not accountable to the public. 
This argument needs to be turned on its head. 
Part II of this essay summarizes the recent case studies of 
California and Ohio.  In Part III, this essay discusses substantive 
criteria potentially appropriate for independent redistricting, followed 
in Part IV by the most promising institutional processes for 
independent redistricting. Part V then discusses the practical 
challenges of reshaping how most states conduct legislative 
redistricting, in light of the historical difficulties reformers have had in 
promoting politically independent redistricting, both in court and 
through popular initiative and legislative reforms. 
II. TWO CASE STUDIES: RECENT REDISTRICTING REFORM EFFORTS 
IN CALIFORNIA AND OHIO 
California and Ohio offer vivid case studies of the struggle 
between politicians, good government groups, and voters over efforts 
to create a redistricting process not dominated by partisan politics. In 
two high-profile campaigns in 2005, both states saw their voters reject 
similar redistricting reform proposals, and both states thereafter have 
explored alternative proposals aggressively. But while in 2008 
California voters narrowly approved a reform measure calling for the 
creation of a fourteen-member citizen redistricting commission,7 so 
far Ohio has remained unable to reform its redistricting process, 
despite repeated additional attempts.8 In 2006, Democrats in the 
minority in the Ohio legislature balked at a Republican offer to put 
before the voters a proposal for an independent redistricting 
commission.9 In 2009, leaders of both parties offered competing 
 
 7. The reform measure was on the statewide ballot as Proposition 11. It was enacted with 
about 51% of the vote. California Secretary of State Debra Bowen, Statement of Vote: 
November 4, 2008, General Election, Dec. 13, 2008, at 65, available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/ 
elections/sov/2008_general/sov_complete.pdf. Proposition 11 amended Article 21 of the 
California Constitution to create the fourteen-member redistricting commission. 
 8. See infra notes 37–45 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
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proposals, but could not find a common approach.10 Versions of these 
proposals remain under consideration in early 2010, but the window 
of opportunity is quickly closing. It therefore is worth thinking about 
whether differences in the details or presentations of the California 
and Ohio proposals may have affected their varying receptions. 
A. California 
In California, as in most states, state legislators traditionally have 
been responsible for drawing legislative and congressional districts. 
Since the 1960s, California Democrats effectively have held power 
over the redistricting process.11 Between 1982 and 1990, Republicans 
thrice failed in efforts to place redistricting in the hands of a 
bipartisan commission.12 Then, in a bit of a shift, the legislative 
redistricting following the 2000 census involved a bipartisan effort to 
entrench both incumbent Democrats and incumbent Republicans.13 
Arguably as evidence of its success, of the 153 congressional and state 
legislative races occurring in November 2004, not a single incumbent 
was defeated and not a single seat changed parties.14 
Against this backdrop, in 2005 California voters considered a 
redistricting reform proposal known as Proposition 77.15  This 
Proposition would have created a redistricting commission composed 
of three retired California state or federal judges, and would have 
required immediate redistricting in time for the 2006 elections 
according to specified criteria, including a prohibition against 
considering political demographics.16 Proponents of Proposition 77, 
 
 10. See infra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 11. Leroy C. Hardy & Charles P. Sohner, Constitutional Challenge and Political Response: 
California Reapportionment, 1965, 23 WEST. POL. Q. 733, 733–51 (1970). 
 12. Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular Initiatives to Establish 
Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L. & POL. 331, 360–68 (2007); see also Office for 
Strategic Information Services, Redistricting Measures That Have Qualified For Statewide Ballot, 
available at http://republican.assembly.ca.gov/flashpoint/RedistrictingMeasures0105.pdf; Jessica 
Oliver, California Initiatives in Perspective 1966-2002 (2003) (research paper on file with 
Claremont McKenna College), available at http://ccdl.libraries.claremont.edu/cdm4/document. 
php?CISOROOT=/ric&CISOPTR=14476&REC=1. 
 13. See Michael Kang, De-Rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of 
Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 667, 667 n.1 (2006). 
 14. John Wildermuth, Some Suspect Governor's Plan to Redraw District Lines, S.F. 
CHRON., Jan. 2, 2005, at A17, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/ 
01/02/BAGM6AK1OD1.DTL. 
 15. Official Voter Information Guide, Text of Proposed Laws (Proposition 77) at 66, 
available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov05/voter_info_pdf/text77.pdf. 
 16. Id. 
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including Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, argued that the initiative 
would create significantly more competitive districts, increase 
minority representation, and remove self-interested incumbents from 
the redistricting process.17 However, well-financed opponents of 
Proposition 77, which included Democrats, Republicans, and minority 
interest groups alike,18 argued that the plan was a “power grab,” that 
retired judges were not representative of the state’s diversity, and that 
the measure left redistricting to a trio of people who were not 
accountable to the voters.19 The proposition was soundly defeated, 
receiving only 40.2% of the vote.20 
In 2008, good government groups including the League of Women 
Voters, Common Cause of California, and AARP took another shot, 
crafting a new reform to address directly the flaws of the 2005 
proposal and of earlier redistricting initiatives. Under this measure, 
dubbed Proposition 11, California would place the power of drawing 
state legislative districts in the hands of its voters in the form of a 
Citizens Redistricting Commission. The Commission would be 
relatively isolated from self-interested politicians and would reflect 
the diversity of California.21 The fourteen-member Commission would 
be selected through an application process open to anyone who had 
been a registered California voter for the previous five years and had 
voted in two of the past three statewide elections, subject to meeting 
additional qualifications. The role of the Citizens Redistricting 
 
 17. Douglas Johnson, Restoring the Competitive Edge: Full Report, Sept. 26, 2005, (report 
on file with Claremont McKenna College), available at http://ccdl.libraries.claremont.edu/cdm4/ 
document.php?CISOROOT=/ric&CISOPTR=2814&REC=2; see also Join Arnold Fact Sheet, 
available at http://digital.library.ucla.edu/websites/2005_997_008/www.joinarnold.com/site/ 
c.itJUJ9MTIuE/b.695343/k.19E6/Proposition_77__The_Voter_Empowerment_Act.htm. 
 18. See, e.g., Christian Berthelson, Group Backing Remap Initiative Caught Up in 
Donations Dispute, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 7, 2005, at B3 (then-House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi 
asking Democrats to help raise money against Prop. 77); Nancy Vogel & Michael Finnegan, 
Stage Set for Fundraising Free-For-All, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2005, at A1, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/19/local/me-redistrict19/3 (request by Reps. Howard 
Berman, D-Calif., and John Doolittle, R-Calif., to raise soft money to defeat Prop. 77); John 
Wildermuth, Debate on Prop. 77 Over Retired Judges, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 17, 2005, at B1 (Senior 
Vice President for Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund stating that three 
people cannot represent diversity of California). 
 19. Jill Stewart, Op-Ed, Terminator vs. Gerrymander, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2005, at A23, 
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9902E2D9143EF934A35752C1A 
9639C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all. 
 20. California Secretary of State Bruce McPherson, State Ballot Measures: Proposition No. 
73–80, Nov. 8, 2005, at 6, available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2005_special/detail_ 
props_formatted_pg1_7.pdf. 
 21. See CAL. CONST. art 21, §§ 1–3; see also CA GOVT. CODE §§ 8251–8253.6 (2008). 
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Commission was to “draw new districts in conformity with strict, 
nonpartisan rules designed to create districts of reasonably equal 
population that will provide fair representation for all Californians.”22 
Support for Proposition 11 gained momentum when the state 
legislature failed to enact a budget by the constitutional deadline.23 
Partisan gridlock in the legislature was blamed for much of the delay 
in passing the budget, and supporters of Proposition 11 argued that 
the establishment of a redistricting commission independent from the 
legislature would render legislators more accountable to voters.24 This 
time, despite opposition once again from Democrats, Republicans, 
and minority interest groups, Proposition 11 passed by a narrow 
margin of 1.8% of the total vote.25 The process of forming the 
fourteen-member Citizens Redistricting Commission is now 
underway, and as of the February 2010 application deadline, the 
California State Auditor had received over 30,000 initial applications 
for the fourteen positions on the commission.26 
B. Ohio 
While the Ohio legislature retains authority to draw the state’s 
congressional districts, since 1967 the redistricting process for both 
houses of the state legislature has resided not in the legislature itself 
but in the hands of a five-member apportionment board composed of 
the Governor, the Secretary of State, the State Auditor, and two 
members respectively appointed by the Republican and Democratic 
legislative leadership. The political party constituting the 
apportionment board majority has reliably seen gains in state 
 
 22. Citizens Redistricting Commission, Background of the California Redistricting 
Commission: A New Experiment in Direct Democracy, http://www.wedrawthelines.ca.gov/ 
downloads/backgrounder.pdf. 
 23. See Matthew Yi, Governor Cuts $510 Million Before Signing Long-Overdue State 
Budget, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 24, 2008, at A1 (noting that Governor Schwarzenegger went to a 
rally for Proposition 11 after signing the late budget and chastising lawmakers). 
 24. Steven Harmon, First Ad in Redistricting Battle Promises to “Clean Up Mess” in 
Sacramento, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008. 
 25. The measure affects the redistricting of only the California Senate, Assembly, and 
Board of Equalization districts. Responsibility for drawing California’s congressional districts 
remains with the state legislature. 
 26. Citizens Redistricting Commission Statistics, Citizens Redistricting Commission, 
https://application.wedrawthelines.ca.gov/statistics (last visited May 5, 2010). However, the 
small proportion of women and minority applicants apparently is worrisome to some. See 
George Skelton, Reform Takes a Tough Road, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2010, at A2, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/18/local/la-me-cap18-2010jan18. 
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legislative seats following each decennial redistricting.27 In 1981, Ohio 
Republicans and the League of Women Voters of Ohio proposed a 
ballot measure to create a bipartisan commission that would have 
created districts based upon a mathematical formula designed to 
achieve optimal compactness.28 Democrats, who then controlled the 
apportionment board, opposed the measure, arguing that it would 
dilute minority representation.29 The measure failed, receiving only 
42% of the vote.30 
By 1990, Republicans controlled a majority of the apportionment 
board. By 1994 Republicans had taken control of both the state 
House and the state Senate. Another League of Women Voters 
reform proposal failed to make it to the ballot in 1999, and 
Republicans maintained control of the apportionment board for the 
post-2001 census redistricting. 
In 2005, a group called Reform Ohio Now (RON) sponsored a 
redistricting reform measure known as Issue 4 that sought to remove 
redistricting from the hands of the apportionment board.31 The 
proposal would have created a bipartisan commission, chosen by state 
court judges, responsible for adopting redistricting plans based on a 
mathematical formula that most rewarded “competitive” electoral 
districts.32 Issue 4 was part of a slate of four constitutional 
amendments designed to reform Ohio’s electoral process more 
generally, in response to noticeable deficiencies in the 2004 elections 
and perceived corruption within Ohio government.33 These ballot 
measures were promoted by several left-of-center interest groups, 
 
 27. Democrats have not held control of both the Ohio House and Senate since several 
legislatures in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Democrats controlled the apportionment 
board. See Political Composition of the Ohio General Assembly—1900 to 2006, Gongwer News 
Service, Inc., available at http://www.gongwer-oh.com/public/gahis.html. 
 28. David Shutt, Amendments Put to Ohioans, TOLEDO BLADE, Nov. 1, 1981, at B9, 
available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=KHgUAAAAIBAJ&sjid=pQIEAAAAIB 
AJ&pg=5540,2617983&dq=ohio+issue-2+1981&hl=en. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Ohio Secretary of State, General Election Overview: November 3, 1981, available at 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResultsMain/1980-1989OfficialElectionResults/ 
GenElectOverview11031981.aspx. 
 31. Dale A. Oesterle, Ohio’s Dramatic Citizen Initiative: “Reform Ohio Now”, ELECTION 
LAW @ MORITZ, Oct. 11, 2005, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/2005/ 
051011.php. 
 32. Ohio Ballot Board, Ohio Issues Report, Nov. 8, 2005, at 10–11, available at 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/elections/2005/OIR2005.pdf. 
 33. See William Hershey, Voters Link Issues with Trust; Dissatisfaction with Politicians Will 
Color Tuesday's Election Outcome, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Nov. 6, 2005, at A1. 
DO NOT DELETE 6/2/2010  12:44:45 PM 
44 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 5:37 
some from out-of-state.34 Opponents of Issue 4, including Republican 
legislative leaders, conducted a high-profile campaign that 
convincingly argued that the measure was an out-of-state power grab 
that would place redistricting in the hands of unaccountable 
bureaucrats, and would still generate horribly disfigured districts, now 
in the name of promoting competition.35 The measure failed badly on 
Election Day 2005, receiving only 30% of the vote.36 
Since the defeat of Issue 4, various state legislators have 
introduced at least ten joint resolutions in the Ohio legislature in an 
attempt to get other redistricting reform proposals before the voters.37 
Of particular note, in 2006, Ohio House Speaker Jon Husted and 
Representative Kevin DeWine, former Republican opponents of 
Issue 4, led a bipartisan reform effort with some supporters of the 
RON movement.38 Their proposal would have created a seven-
member redistricting commission composed of four members 
appointed by the legislative leaders of both major parties, and three 
others chosen by the four appointed members.39 The proposal allowed 
members of the public to submit redistricting plans to the commission 
for consideration. Each plan was required to protect existing political 
subdivisions as much as possible, and within that constraint, to 
maximize competitive districts. 
However, in the wake of scandals that shook the Ohio Republican 
Party in 2006, legislative Democrats opposed redistricting reform, 
even voting against the same measure they had proposed a year 
earlier40 and opting to take their chances on capturing an 
 
 34. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 12, at 375. 
 35. See id. at 376. 
 36. Ohio Secretary of State, 2005 Election Results: General Election—November 8, 2005, 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResultsMain/2005ElectionsResults/051108Issue4.a
spx. 
 37. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 5, 128th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2009–10); S.J. Res. 4, 128th Gen. Assem. 
(Ohio 2009–10); H.J. Res. 15, 128th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2009–10); S.J. Res. 6, 127th Gen. 
Assem. (Ohio 2007–08); H.J. Res. 4, 127th Gen. Assembly (Ohio 2007–08); H.J. Res. 1, 127th 
Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2007–08); S.J. Res. 5, 126th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2005–06); H.J. Res. 13, 
126th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2005–06); H.J. Res. 9, 126th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2005–06); H.J. Res. 6, 
126th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2005–06). 
 38. William Hershey, Legislative Districts May Be Fall Ballot Issue; Kevin DeWine 
Introducing Measure to Allow Ohio Voters to Change How Redistricting Is Done, DAYTON 
DAILY NEWS, May 5, 2006, at A6. 
 39. H.J. Res. 13 (Ohio 2005-06). 
 40. Jim Siegel, Redistricting Plans Rejected; Democrats Vote Down GOP Plan, Then Their 
Own, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 26, 2006, at 1D. 
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apportionment board majority in November 2006 (which they did).41 
They anticipated that the party that captured the three open 
apportionment board seats in the 2006 election would, four years 
later, reelect these same statewide office holders as incumbents, and 
thus retain control of the board for the 2011 redistricting cycle.42 
In both 2007 and 2008, legislative Republicans again introduced 
joint resolutions to reform Ohio’s redistricting process, with various 
combinations of a bipartisan board or substantive constraints on map 
drawing, to no effect.43 In 2009, the Republican-controlled Ohio 
Senate passed a joint resolution proposing to amend the state 
constitution to establish an augmented apportionment board, 
consisting of four legislative branch members instead of two. The 
amendment would have required the board to select, by a 
supermajority voting rule, a redistricting plan that promoted district 
compactness by protecting existing political subdivisions, and then to 
maximize competitiveness where possible.44 Meanwhile, in the now 
Democrat-controlled Ohio House, a joint resolution is pending that 
would force the existing apportionment board to choose from among 
plans submitted by Ohio residents the one that conforms most closely 
with a predetermined partisan index number.45 Ohio Democrats, who 
once felt confident about retaining control of the apportionment 
board after the 2010 election, today see their prospects as much 
cloudier, leaving both parties potentially more willing to take the risk-
averse route of supporting a redistricting reform ballot measure in the 
November 2010 elections. 
III. SUBSTANTIVE REDISTRICTING CRITERIA AND CONSTRAINTS 
Many of the recent Ohio proposals described above have offered 
to reform redistricting not by restructuring the state apportionment 
board, but by imposing additional constraints on the plans that the 
board (or, in the case of congressional districts, the state legislature) 
may consider. The fact that these proposals have not attracted much 
 
 41. Joe Hallett, Democrats Might Not Be Up to Doing the Right Thing on Redistricting, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 14, 2006, at 5B. 
 42. See id.; Jonathan Riskind, OHIO’S GOP-dominated Congressional Delegation Faces a 
New Tide, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 21, 2007, at 5G. 
 43. S.J. Res. 6, 127th Ohio Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2007–08); H.J. Res. 4, 127th Gen. Assem. 
(Ohio 2007–08); H.J. Res. 1, 127th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2007–08). 
 44. Sub. S.J. Res. 5, 128th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2009–10). 
 45. H.J. Res. 15, 128th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2009–10). 
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bipartisan support may say more about the need to couple criteria 
reform with process reform than about whether efforts to specify 
stronger redistricting criteria are themselves misguided. In addition, 
there is little uniform agreement on what balance of redistricting 
criteria is most appropriate, beyond the truism that federal law 
requires districts with equal population drawn in compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act, and an overwhelming (though not universally 
codified) preference for contiguous districts. This Part briefly 
identifies the key redistricting criteria, and concludes by suggesting 
that a flexible, participatory approach to choosing among these 
options may be appropriate. 
A. Consideration of Party Affiliation or Support 
As the film Gerrymandering46 points out, redistricting has 
transformed dramatically over the years largely because of the ever-
increasing sophistication of mapping tools and the use of exceedingly 
precise demographic data.  When political partisans control 
redistricting, it can be, and generally is, manipulated to self-interested 
ends. One reform therefore would be to prohibit the use of party 
registration data and precinct voting records in the drawing of district 
boundaries. This is the “blind” version of apolitical redistricting 
identified in the Introduction. 
This type of constraint, though supported in some quarters,47 has 
two main problems. The first is that other data can readily, if 
somewhat erratically, be used as a proxy for party affiliation. When 
partisan redistricting commissions or legislatures draw maps, the 
mapmakers are sure to be aware of where their supporters and 
opponents are strongest, even without looking at precise voting 
patterns. By looking instead at neighborhood socio-economic levels 
or racial composition—which Voting Rights Act compliance may even 
mandate considering—districts may still be drawn with a deliberate 
partisan effect.48 Admittedly, mapmakers will be taking greater risks in 
attempting to predict the partisan composition of districts without 
 
 46. GERRYMANDERING (Green Film Company 2010). 
 47. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 600–01; Illinois Reform Commission, 100 Day 
Report, at 56–57 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.reformillinoisnow.org/press%20releases/ 
IRC%20100-Day%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf; Proposition 77, (2)(i), available at http://www. 
sos.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov05/voter_info_pdf/text77.pdf. 
 48. In fact, in some jurisdictions the Voting Rights Act may even require the direct 
consideration of partisan electoral data, in order to determine whether minority-voting patterns 
are polarized and whether a remedial district is effective. 
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access to detailed party affiliation data, and that heightened risk could 
dampen the enthusiasm for partisan excess in the process. But there 
are more effective ways of constraining the partisan excesses than to 
redirect mapmakers into using secondary data to accomplish partisan 
gerrymanders. 
This is especially true in light of the second problem of blind 
redistricting, which is that it may be in fact less fair. This is most 
obviously true if blind redistricting occurs according to other criteria 
that favor compact districts or protect existing political subdivisions 
and other communities of interest. According to prevailing 
demographic trends of the early twenty-first century, this type of 
redistricting may more often naturally pack heavily Democratic urban 
voters into fewer districts overall, while dispersing a majority of 
Republicans more evenly throughout a greater number of suburban 
and rural districts.49 Accordingly, as next discussed, relying on party 
affiliation data may be required in order to achieve some versions of 
fairness in drawing district maps. An independent redistricting scheme 
therefore need not prohibit the use of data concerning citizens’ party 
affiliation, but should instead look for other ways to control the use of 
this data for self-interested partisan manipulation. 
B. Partisan Fairness 
Juxtaposed against the notion of partisan manipulation might be 
the ideal of partisan fairness. In a plurality-based electoral system, 
partisan fairness does not mean that the proportion of legislative seats 
won by a specific political party must match the proportion of total 
votes cast for legislative candidates who are members of that party. 
Instead, partisan fairness can be thought of in terms of whether a 
change in vote share of a specific amount in either direction would 
produce a symmetrical, rather than proportional, change in seats won 
by either party.50 For instance, if a 1% increase in vote share for party 
A would result in party A capturing 5% more legislative seats, then a 
1% increase in vote share for party B should result in party B 
capturing 5% more seats. This type of system is not proportional, 
 
 49. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Reapportionment and Party 
Alignment in the American States, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 433, 436–37 (2004); Lowenstein & 
Steinberg, supra note 4, at 23–24 (noting malapportionment across regions largely benefitted 
political party of rural areas). 
 50. Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for 
Partisan Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELEC. L.J. 2, 8–9 (2006). 
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because a given change in vote share may legitimately generate a 
disproportionate seat bonus, but nonetheless the system is fair as long 
as corresponding changes affect parties symmetrically. 
Among political scientists, symmetry is widely accepted as the best 
measure of fairness.51 It can be easily incorporated into a redistricting 
framework, and fairness, as thus conceptualized, could serve as an 
objective tool for measuring or evaluating the absence of partisan bias 
in a redistricting scheme. Indeed, symmetry may be worthy of primary 
attention as a redistricting criterion, certainly as much as the typical 
three “C’”s” of redistricting reform—competitiveness, compactness, 
and communities of interest—to which we now turn. 
C. Competitiveness 
Competitiveness has been a driving force behind many recent 
redistricting reform efforts, and was the centerpiece of the rejected 
2005 Ohio proposal. Although a variety of methods for measuring 
competitiveness exist, the general approach is to look district-by-
district at the closeness of the margin of victory of the top statewide 
race in the average of several recent elections. The more districts in 
which this margin is close, however “close” is defined, the more 
competitive the overall map. 
The primary argument for using competitiveness as a redistricting 
touchstone is that competitive elections will enhance electoral 
accountability and produce representatives more in step with the 
median voter. If this premise is accepted, then it is natural to prefer 
district maps that produce a greater number of competitive elections. 
If competitiveness is to be used as a redistricting criterion, several 
choices will need to be made concerning which elections to use for the 
baseline calculation of victory margin, what victory margin to deem 
competitive, and whether to penalize a redistricting scheme that 
includes highly noncompetitive, or even simply noncompetitive, 
districts. 
More recently, however, competitiveness has lost some of its 
luster. Although it still maintains a strong following in the reform 
 
 51. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 465–66 
(2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the symmetry 
standard “is widely accepted by scholars as providing a measure of partisan fairness in electoral 
systems”); Grofman & King, supra note 50, at 9 (“Most scholars therefore regard electoral 
systems with higher levels of electoral responsiveness as better.”);  
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community, it has come under criticism both with respect to the 
validity of the premise that it enhances electoral accountability, and 
because one of its results may be to maximize the number of voters 
disaffected because their candidate loses.52 Justin Buchler is among 
those making careful arguments against competitiveness along these 
lines.53 Prioritizing competitiveness may also require its own version 
of distorted map drawing, as opponents of Ohio’s 2005 reform 
proposal effectively argued, because voters tend to reside in non-
competitive patterns.54 
Nonetheless, competitiveness may still deserve a place at the 
redistricting table. Arguments for it can be made for reasons 
independent of electoral accountability, including the impact of 
competitive elections on the quality of campaign debate, and the 
resultant shaping of public understanding and preferences on matters 
of public policy. Competitive districts also may affect the prospects for 
attracting and grooming quality candidates. Moreover, using 
competitiveness as a redistricting factor may temper the redistricting 
body’s ability to selectively disadvantage one party’s incumbents or 
candidates. But as a general rule, it is difficult to identify how much 
value to place on the overall competitiveness of a redistricting 
scheme. It therefore may be important to place greater emphasis on 
partisan fairness, discussed above, while also providing ways, discussed 
below, for the voters themselves to retain some flexibility in deciding 
whether to seek greater competitiveness. 
D. Compactness 
Compactness, whether measured by comparing the area of a 
district with its perimeter, the ratio of district length to width, or in 
several other possible ways (or merely eyeballed rather than 
measured), is attractive as a redistricting criterion for both symbolic 
and practical reasons. Symbolically, non-compactness is almost a 
synonym for gerrymandering, and the bizarre configuration of many 
districts is often taken as evidence of partisan distortion. Indeed, 
 
 52. See Justin Buchler, Competition, Representation and Redistricting: The Case Against 
Competitive Congressional Districts, 17 J. THEORETICAL POLITICS 431 (2005); see also THOMAS 
L. BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION: WHY COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS ARE 
BAD FOR AMERICA (2008). 
 53. E.g., Justin Buchler, The Inevitability of Gerrymandering: Winners and Losers Under 
Alternative Approaches to Redistricting, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 17 (2010). 
 54. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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without compactness, the requirement of district contiguity has 
become almost a caricature, and may not be worth having at all when 
not supported by some additional sensibility like compactness. 
Requiring compact districts therefore constrains mapmakers from too 
much manipulation. Yet distorted shapes may serve unbiased or 
neutral ends, too, such as keeping the overall map fairer or 
ameliorating some of the bias that may result from protecting 
communities of interest. 
Nevertheless, there are practical reasons to prefer compact 
districts. Compact districts may enhance representation because 
representatives and candidates can more easily know and traverse 
their district. A compact district also may promote the development 
of a new community of interest—consisting of the district itself—to 
the extent that the compactness facilitates a sense of shared 
community among its residents. 
E. Communities of Interest and Political Subdivisions 
There is widespread agreement that, all other things being equal, a 
redistricting plan should not split into separate districts voters who 
are part of some pre-existing political subdivision or other community 
of interest. But, because all other things are not equal, the difficulty is 
in determining for what purposes the splitting of such communities is 
permissible. In many locales, voters tend to reside near those who are 
politically like-minded, so preserving communities of interest, like 
preferring compact districts, may have the direct result of reducing 
the overall competitiveness of a redistricting plan. Yet, valorizing 
competitiveness may be particularly misguided when it would 
disaggregate voters whose natural residential patterns have given rise 
to strong geographic political preferences. It is hard to say definitively 
when existing communities of interest should and should not remain 
sacrosanct, but easy to say that the concern merits attention in the 
redistricting process. 
F. Flexibility and Accountability in Prioritizing Among Possible 
Criteria 
The preceding reflections on potential criteria for constraining a 
redistricting process demonstrate the complexity of establishing a 
specific framework. Indeed, there is little agreement on what are truly 
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neutral and fair redistricting principles.55 Although many different 
models have been proposed,56 it is difficult to know ahead of time, and 
for the circumstances of a particular state, how best to weight and 
aggregate potential criteria such as partisan fairness, competitiveness, 
compactness, and communities of interest. Furthermore, because 
different citizens and interest groups may prioritize these criteria 
differently, some trade-offs or compromises may be required. 
That is not to say that settling on a best set of neutral redistricting 
criteria for a particular state will be problematic, only that it will take 
additional work in each state. But one easily made generalization is 
that the process by which a state seeks to specify its criteria can make 
a huge difference to the acceptability of these citeria. When 
redistricting criteria are presented prepackaged by a particular reform 
community, they can be easy targets for opponents to attack, given 
that, as noted above, most potential criteria have some vulnerabilities 
to be exploited. Accordingly, in many reform efforts, proposed 
constraints have been rejected as “elite” meddling. 
An alternative approach would be to give the public more of a 
role in the specification of redistricting criteria than a simple up-or-
down vote on a ballot measure (or than a legislative fait accompli in 
states without the initiative process). This becomes a meta-level point 
about how to implement an apolitical redistricting system, discussed 
further in Part V. In addition, the lack of clear agreement on the right 
set of redistricting criteria also suggests that efforts to achieve 
apolitical redistricting through criteria reform alone may be 
insufficient, and that institutional and process reform therefore may 
be an essential element. 
IV. REDISTRICTING PROCESSES AND INSTITUTIONS 
Typical redistricting reform efforts have proposed establishing 
independent commissions to draw legislative maps, in place of the 
 
 55. See Fromer, supra note 3, at 1550 (describing the question of what constitutes a fair 
redistricting scheme as “bedeviling and pressing”). 
 56. See, e.g., Sam Hirsch, A Proposal for Redistricting Reform: A Model State 
Constitutional Amendment, delivered at the American Mathematical Society’s Special Session 
on the Redistricting Problem (Jan. 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.americansforredistrictingreform.org/html/documents/HirschRedistrictingPaperforA
merMathSociety.pdf.; Building a National Redistricting Reform Movement, Report of the April 
2006 Redistricting Conference hosted by the Campaign Legal Center, League of Women 
Voters, and The Council for Excellence in Government, available at 
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/1641.pdf. 
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state legislatures that historically have been responsible for 
redistricting. Although today close to half of the states already assign 
an entity other than the legislature some role in the redistricting 
process,57 in most of these cases either the non-legislative institution is 
itself partisan in design, as with Ohio’s apportionment board, or the 
legislature retains substantial partisan control and influence over the 
process, as with New York’s advisory redistricting commission.58 
Notable exceptions include Arizona, which established an 
independent redistricting commission in 2000, and Iowa, where, 
although the legislature retains final authority, a nonpartisan staff 
agency, the Legislative Service Bureau, has produced the maps in each 
of the past three decennial redistricting cycles.59 
Some reform proposals that seek only to constrain an existing 
redistricting institution through criteria reform60 have encountered 
skepticism because they would leave the institution’s partisan 
structure intact.61 In part this skepticism may result from lack of 
agreement about what are truly neutral redistricting principles, which 
may heighten concerns that it is unrealistic to expect to constrain an 
inherently biased redistricting body. It may also reflect the difficulty 
of drafting redistricting rules so tightly as to eliminate all room for 
human judgment, because of concerns about unintended 
 
 57. JUSTIN LEVITT, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 20–22 (2008). 
 58. N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83-m. 
 59. ARIZ. CONST. art. 8, §§ 1–5 (Arizona Redistricting Commission); IOWA CODE §§ 42.1–
42.6 (2009). 
 60. For example, the Indiana State legislature currently redraws the state’s districts subject 
only to the requirement that districts be contiguous. The Indiana State Senate recently 
approved a redistricting reform bill, Indiana Senate Bill 80, that would require the state 
legislature to follow additional criteria including compactness, preserving communities of 
interest, protecting minority rights, and respecting county boundaries. S.B. 80, 116th Leg., 2d 
Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2010); see also Community Comment: Redistricting Deserves Independent Look, 
EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS, Feb. 21, 2010, available at http://www.courierpress.com/news/ 
2010/feb/21/redistricting-deserves-independent-look/ (containing joint statement by AARP 
Indiana, Common Cause/Indiana, and the League of Women Voters of Indiana criticizing S.B. 
80 for failing to prohibit the use of partisan political data). Proposals now under consideration in 
Florida, if adopted, would require the legislature to draw districts without any “intent to favor 
or disfavor” a political party. See FairDistrictsFlorida.org, Our Reforms, 
http://www.fairdistrictsflorida.org/our_reforms.php (discussing Amendments 5 and 6 on an 
upcoming ballot). 
 61. See, e.g., Jim Siegel, Ohio House Democrats Have Plan to Redistrict, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, Feb. 2, 2010, at 1B (quoting OSU political scientist Richard Gunther to say that 
proposed criteria reform alone is “inadequate” to prevent worst partisan abuses, and should be 
melded with institutional reform); cf. Fromer, supra note 3, at 1570–86 (discussing 
vulnerabilities of various redistricting criteria); Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 644–45 (describing 
inherent conflict of interest in letting legislators conduct redistricting). 
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consequences. In other words, the more that a redistricting institution 
is independent of those seeking to represent the districts, the more 
room there may be to allow some flexibility in the criteria that 
institution must employ. Furthermore, it is always easy to condemn 
the outcome of any process perceived to be controlled by a biased 
group, particularly given the lack of agreement on what criteria 
should constrain the process. Therefore, regardless of the substantive 
constraints adopted, independent redistricting may also require 
reforming who is in charge of the process, and how that institution 
functions. 
This Part addresses two key points related to the prospect of 
institutional reform of the redistricting process. The first point, which 
Michael Kang, Daniel Lowenstein, Heather Gerken, and others have 
previously made, is that the redistricting process in fact may need 
more politics, properly defined, not less.62 The second point is related. 
In redistricting, as in matters of governance generally, citizens 
gravitate towards the principle of accountability. This Part seeks to 
extend both of these insights toward promoting greater citizen 
participation in redistricting institutions, rather than giving the 
redistricting task to independent experts or bipartisan commissions. 
A. Could Infusing Additional Politics Lead to a More “Apolitical” 
Redistricting? 
Though sympathetic with the effort to rid the redistricting process 
of partisan manipulation, Michael Kang has argued that 
[d]elegation of redistricting to apolitical institutions, such as courts 
and independent commissions, comes with heavy costs . . . . [It] 
ensures that redistricting is far removed from the necessary degree 
of public engagement, scrutiny, and accountability . . . . [R]eformers 
would eradicate from redistricting the positive values of the 
political process as well.63 
He continues: “Redistricting is an inherently political question 
that ultimately requires political answers.”64 
In labeling redistricting as “inherently political,” Kang 
contemplates a version of the notion described earlier that different 
citizens may prioritize possible redistricting criteria differently. 
 
 62. See infra notes 63–69 and accompanying text. 
 63. Kang, supra note 13, at 668. 
 64. Id. at 686. 
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Because there is no clear answer about which criteria to favor, 
choosing among these possibilities is a political question in the sense 
that it requires making a policy choice among contested options. It 
need not, however, be a partisan issue. 
Of course, one way to handle this political question would be to 
propose to the voters a particular algorithm or arrangement of reform 
criteria for redistricters to use to draw the maps, and let the voters, or 
their representatives, approve that set of criteria. But what Kang has 
in mind instead is to let existing redistricting institutions continue to 
have primary responsibility for preparing district maps, using 
whatever criteria may (or may not) already be in place, and then to 
require the resulting maps to be submitted to the voters for 
approval.65 This act of direct democracy is what Kang describes as the 
infusion of additional politics into the redistricting process.66 
Professor Daniel Lowenstein has followed this suggestion in a 
challenge to California’s recent reform. Lowenstein is the primary 
sponsor of a constitutional initiative that would repeal Proposition 11, 
thereby disbanding the Citizens Redistricting Commission and 
returning redistricting responsibility to the state legislature, while also 
making the legislature’s adoption of redistricting maps subject to the 
referendum process (as is also now the case under Proposition 11).67 
Lowenstein agrees with Kang that redistricting is inherently political, 
and argues that “when you try to take a political process and put it in 
the hands of bureaucrats who are supposed to be non-partisan, it’s a 
fraud and it’s not going to work.”68 The ballot measure, called the 
Financial Accountability in Redistricting Act, will be before the voters 
in November 2010. 
Although many observers view the Financial Accountability in 
Redistricting Act as an effort by California Democrats to regain 
control of the redistricting process,69 Lowenstein and Kang argue that 
 
 65. Id. at 699–713. 
 66. Id. at 668–70. 
 67. Financial Accountability in Redistricting Act, available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/ 
2009/090861.aspx. 
 68. James Koren, Some Democrats Seek to Roll Back Citizen Control of Redistricting, 
DAILY BULLETIN, Feb. 17, 2010, available at http://www.dailybulletin.com/ci_14421716. Political 
scientist Thomas Brunell, after arguing that increased competitiveness should not be a 
redistricting objective, similarly urges that the redistricting task be given to a group of 
individuals from a diverse cross-section of the state, popularly elected to perform this duty, 
namely, the state legislature. BRUNELL, supra note 52, at 116. 
 69. Lowenstein himself has indicated that Democratic congressman Howard Berman is 
behind the initiative. See Kevin Modesti, New Redistricting Process is Giving Power to the 
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the referendum process is sufficient to inject a healthy dose of public 
involvement into redistricting. This act of direct democracy, they 
suggest, should curb both the inclination and the ability of the 
legislative mapmakers to gerrymander to excessive partisan ends. 
Although a referendum-based redistricting process would in a sense 
be more political, the aspiration is that it would be less manipulated 
by partisan elites. The broader public politics of the process thus 
should produce a redistricting map that has less of partisan bias, and 
in that sense produce an outcome that is more “apolitical.” 
B. Citizens Want Their Redistricting Institution to be “Accountable” 
A related point is how much citizens crave the principle of 
accountability. Regardless of how well voters take advantage of this 
principle, they understandably want the ability to hold anyone 
involved in the political process accountable. This extends to the 
redistricting process, a central component of our political system. 
Accordingly, one of the more effective arguments against an 
independent redistricting commission often has been that it would 
render the redistricters unaccountable to the voters: once they are 
appointed, the public loses control over them. For instance, precisely 
this argument figured prominently in the campaigns to defeat the 
2005 Ohio and California ballot measures. 
Although accountability can take various forms, it typically means 
the ability to defeat an untrustworthy or incompetent public servant 
at the polls. Yet there is an obvious irony (as my law students are 
quick to point out) in wanting those who draw the maps to be 
accountable to the voters, while at the same time letting them draw 
their own maps even in self-interested ways that often deliberately 
reduce voters’ abilities to defeat them on Election Day! Furthermore, 
in some states, crucial aspects of the redistricting process occur behind 
closed doors, leaving voters little opportunity to understand how 
particular redistricting choices were made and when to blame their 
specific legislator for complicity in a redistricting abuse. 
In states with the popular referendum,70 the option to override the 
 
People, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Feb. 22, 2010, at A1 (“The repeal effort is officially headed by 
UCLA law professor Daniel Lowenstein but backed by Democratic members of Congress led 
by Rep. Howard Berman, D-Van Nuys.”). 
 70. Twenty-four states currently provide for a popular referendum. Initiative & 
Referendum Institute, What Are Ballot Propositions, Initiatives, and Referendums?, 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/Quick%20Fact%20-%20What%20is%20I&R.htm. 
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actions of the redistricting institution can provide another type of 
accountability. But the extent to which voters can meaningfully 
exercise this option is limited if the redistricting processes are 
conducted in secret. Although the resulting maps themselves are 
public, knowledge of why the districts take the form they do also 
would be relevant to a meaningful decision of whether to accept the 
map. Accordingly, another aspect of the proposed Financial 
Accountability in Redistricting Act would be to require the California 
legislature to conduct redistricting in an open fashion, with many 
opportunities for public participation. 
Yet even when the redistricting process occurs openly, the 
shibboleth of electoral “accountability” may be more illusion than 
reality. It is an example of what political scientist J.H. Snider has 
called “electoral fundamentalism,” the misplaced belief “that 
unfettered competition for voter support among candidates for an 
elected office is adequate to maximize social welfare.”71 Specifically 
with respect to redistricting in which legislators are in charge of the 
mapmaking, in Madisonian terms there simply may be no competing 
ambition sufficient to counteract the ambition of the mapmakers. 
Legislators rarely will pay a price for drawing their districts in self-
interested, rather than public-interested, ways. 
Nevertheless, accountability is still what the public wants, even 
though it results in rejecting methods of redistricting that likely would 
make legislators more accountable. Regardless of how misplaced this 
desire for accountability may be in connection with redistricting 
reform, it is a reality that needs to be accepted rather than resisted in 
seeking to design an independent redistricting process. The next 
section therefore considers how to design a redistricting institution 
that satisfies the urge for accountability while also promoting partisan 
independence. 
C. Prospects for Greater Citizen Involvement in Redistricting 
Institutions 
The most promising approach to ridding much of the partisan 
excesses from the redistricting process, while also providing the public 
 
 71. J.H. Snider, If Men Were Angels . . . : Should the Checks & Balances System Include 
Electoral Reform Juries?, delivered at the 2009 Annual Meeting & Exhibition of the American 
Political Science Association (Sept. 3–6, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1451155. 
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with a much more meaningful version of accountability than exists 
when legislators draw their own lines, would be to substantially 
increase direct public participation in the process of creating and 
choosing legislative maps. In contrast to the approaches of 
Lowenstein and Kang, in which legislatures still would craft the map 
but then have to submit it for popular approval, this approach calls 
for heavy citizen input in all stages of crafting the map. Furthermore, 
as suggested above it also could allow the possibility of similar citizen 
input in refining the substantive criteria to be used for comparing and 
evaluating potential maps. 
Heather Gerken has previously written about the risk that, in the 
pursuit of independence from partisan politics, electoral reform 
projects, including redistricting reform efforts, can become 
disconnected with political reality.72 Political reforms are often elite-
driven and can evince an ivory tower quality, which the public may 
resent and politicians easily can ridicule. While Gerken’s caution may 
apply most forcefully to the issue of how to build sufficient political 
and popular support to get a reform measure adopted (the focus of 
Part V of this essay), it also has implications for the related issue of 
how to design the best redistricting institution. Her suggestion is that 
reform efforts seek to “inoculate” themselves against politics, rather 
than insulate themselves from politics entirely.73 Just how much 
inoculation is ideal, or what weakened virus to put in the vaccine, will 
depend on the type of reform.74 
Ohio recently experimented with an approach to redistricting that 
provides an interesting variation on the idea of political inoculation. 
In April and May of 2009, a group composed of Ohio Secretary of 
State Jennifer Brunner, several current and former state legislators, 
the League of Women Voters of Ohio, Common Cause, and other 
non-partisan advocacy organizations sponsored a redistricting 
competition that invited public participation in the map drawing 
process.75 The group, called Ohio Redistricting Competition Partners, 
held the competition to show that an open process based on objective 
 
 72. Heather Gerken, The Double-Edged Sword of Independence: Inoculating Electoral 
Reform Commissions Against Everyday Politics, 6 ELECTION L.J. 184, 191 (2007). 
 73. Id. at 185. 
 74. Id. at 194. 
 75. Ohio Secretary of State, Ohio Redistricting Competition, Competition Facts, 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/redistrictInfoComp/redistrictFacts.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 
2010). 
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criteria can generate fair legislative districts.76 
Any member of the public was allowed to register and submit a 
redistricting plan for Ohio’s congressional districts, using 2000 census 
data and free software and training provided for the competition.77 To 
qualify for consideration, submissions had to meet three 
requirements, in compliance with federal law: contiguous districts, 
equal population across districts, and adherence to Voting Rights Act 
requirements.78 The competition then scored qualifying plans under a 
pre-determined formula relying on four quantifiable factors: (1) 
communities of interest (including counties and municipalities); (2) 
compactness; (3) competitiveness; and (4) representational fairness.79 
Using this evaluation methodology, the three “winning” plans scored 
dramatically higher than the actual 2001 congressional redistricting 
plan, and even the worst scoring submission scored substantially 
higher than the existing map in terms of the greater number of 
competitive districts, the reduced number of fragmented communities 
of interest, and district compactness.80 
This example, though conducted as only a hypothetical exercise, 
exemplifies another kind of infusion into the redistricting process of 
more “politics,” again in the sense of public deliberation about a 
significant policy choice. One of the initiative proposals under serious 
consideration in the 2010 Ohio legislature81 draws heavily from the 
Ohio Redistricting Competition model. Similarly, Micah Altman and 
Michael McDonald have collaborated on the development of an open 
source mapmaking software tool, which could allow widespread 
public participation in the design of district maps.82 
This kind of public politicking has the potential to displace the 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Much of the training and administration was provided by Mark Salling, see Ohio 
Secretary of State, Ohio Redistricting Competition: Software training, http://www.sos.state.oh. 
us/SOS/redistrictInfoComp/softwareTraining.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2010), another 
contributor to this symposium, see Mark J. Salling, Ohio’s Use of Geographic Information 
Systems to Demonstrate Public Participation in the Redistricting Process, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 113 (2010). 
 78. Id. at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/redistrictInfoComp/redistrictFacts.aspx.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See H.J. Res. 15, 128th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2009–10). 
 82. See generally Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, BARD: Better Automated 
Redistricting, 34 J. STATISTICAL SOFTWARE (forthcoming 2010); cf. Micah Altman & Micah 
McDonald, The Promise and Perils of Computers in Redistricting, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 69 (2010). 
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partisan politicking that has traditionally characterized most 
redistricting in the United States. Again, any number of variants on 
this idea can be imagined, whether open public competitions, or 
citizen assemblies, or electoral reform juries.83 Furthermore, 
depending on local conditions in various states, this type of broadly 
participatory approach might occur as an official government process, 
as some sort of state-sanctioned decennial citizen assembly, or as a 
private sector, self-appointed effort to create a public consensus. 
Many other details of a citizen assembly or jury, such as the size, 
selection process, and governing rules, or of the structure and 
administration of a public competition, would of course also need to 
be settled, as would the substantive criteria for the resulting 
mapmaking. These details can be especially important to civil rights 
groups, which understandably may worry that poorly constituted 
citizen assemblies will result in majority interests swamping minority 
concerns. The key, therefore, is to structure a meta-level process that 
will enable states to foster widespread agreement upon these details 
when they adopt their own version of a transparent, citizen-led 
(rather than elite-dominated) redistricting institution and 
accompanying redistricting criteria. 
V. OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION 
On its face, the idea of giving redistricting responsibility to a 
citizen assembly, or of conducting a public mapmaking competition as 
more than just a hypothetical exercise, may seem a hopelessly 
unrealistic and ivory tower endeavor. Especially given how little this 
essay has spelled out the actual details either of such a process or of 
the substantive criteria that should constrain it, the idea 
understandably may provoke the response: “How can this possibly 
work? What we really need is something like Sam Hirsch’s fully 
formed model constitutional amendment!”84 A citizen-directed 
reform, however, including one that also entrusts the specification of 
many of these details to the citizens, may hold greater promise of 
 
 83. See generally Snider, supra note 71 (discussing electoral reform juries); Chris 
Elmendorf, Election Commissions & Electoral Reform: An Overview, 5 ELECTORAL L.J. 425 
(2006). Elmendorf and Ethan Leib have a joint effort underway to develop a more specific 
design of a citizen assembly. Ethan Leib, Leib v. Gerken/Elmendorf on Electoral Reform 
Design: 4 Years Later, PROFSBLAWG, July 10, 2009, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/ 
2009/07/leib-v-gerkenelmendorf-on-electoral-reform-design-4-years-later.html. 
 84. See generally Hirsch, supra note 56. 
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actual implementation than any other approach. 
For starters, a juriscentric approach to redistricting reform under 
the federal constitution is a clear long shot.85 Also unlikely to succeed, 
given the current partisan gridlock in Congress, are efforts to impose 
a federal mandate that states redistrict their congressional seats in a 
particular way.86 Nor do calls for a constitutional amendment seem 
likely to go very far.87 And despite an effort currently underway in 
Minnesota,88 few state legislatures are likely to support legislative 
efforts to give away their redistricting authority, at least not until a 
bandwagon effect is underway from other states’ reforms. Instead, as 
in California in 2008 and Arizona in 2000,89 redistricting reform is 
most likely to come through the popular initiative. 
Unfortunately, redistricting reform initiatives have usually failed, 
often by wide margins. One careful study of all twelve redistricting 
reform ballot measures to face the electorate between 1936 and 2008 
concluded that the most important variable affecting the success or 
failure of such a measure, much more than the specific content of a 
reform proposal or any recent history of partisan gerrymandering in 
the state, was the strength of the majority party’s opposition to the 
reform.90 
The strength (and funding) of the opposition effort may not tell 
 
 85. In the wake of Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), some scholars have attempted to 
articulate a justiciable standard for identifying unconstitutional gerrymandering, see, e.g., 
Laughlin McDonald, The Looming 2010 Census: A Proposed Judicially Manageable Standard 
and Other Reform Options for Partisan Gerrymandering, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS. 243 (2009); 
Grofman & King, supra note 50, at 5 (holding out hope that a Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 
(1954), moment for political gerrymandering will arrive to usher in a judicially triggered 
redistricting revolution). To be sure, a juriscentric approach to redistricting reform will not 
happen before the 2011 round of redistricting, and it also seems doubtful that it will happen in 
the wake of this round. A handful of state constitutions do have as-yet untested provisions that 
would prohibit undue favoritism of party or candidate. 
 86. See David Schultz, Regulating the Political Thicket: Congress the Courts, and State 
Reapportionment Commissions, 3 CHARLESTON L. REV. 107, 140–43 (2008) (proposing that 
Congress mandate use of redistricting commissions); see also Fairness and Independence in 
Redistricting Act of 2009, S. 1332, 111th Cong. (2009); Fairness and Independence in 
Redistricting Act of 2009, H.R. 3025, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing to prohibit States from 
carrying out more than one congressional redistricting after a decennial census, and to require 
States to conduct redistricting through independent commissions). 
 87. See David Brooks, What’s Next, Mr. President?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.12, 2010, at A31. 
 88. See H.F. 198, 86th Legis. Sess. (Minn. 2009–2010) (proposing a four-member temporary 
redistricting advisory committee selected by the legislative leadership of the State House and 
State Senate). 
 89. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, Proposition 106, available at 
http://www.azredistricting.org/?page=prop106 (last visited Apr. 14, 2010). 
 90. Stephanopoulos, supra note 12, at 380. 
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the complete story, however. In the prototypical reform effort, the 
majority party’s aggressive opposition campaign also has been able to 
capitalize on two distinct vulnerabilities: (1) the relatively low salience 
of redistricting reform among the general public and (2) public 
skepticism towards elite and unaccountable commissions. Both of 
these vulnerabilities could be neutralized, or at least meaningfully 
reduced, with a substantially more participatory reform process 
focusing on citizen control rather than independent commissions. 
A. Overcoming Low Salience 
Professors Joshua Fougere, Stephen Ansolabehere, and Nathaniel 
Persily recently completed an empirical study of voters’ attitudes 
towards redistricting reform.91 They concluded that “one of the 
primary takeaways from our study is that Americans are not well-
informed or strongly opinionated when it comes to drawing election 
districts.”92 Even recent reform organization polling, after priming 
respondents about their level of distrust of government, finds that 
respondents rank redistricting reform below most other reform 
proposals in terms of how much impact it would have.93 This suggests 
an obvious disconnect between the general public, on the one hand, 
and the advocacy and reform communities, on the other, who in 
contrast to the general public are greatly exercised about redistricting 
reform, perhaps seeing it as more important than campaign finance 
reform.94 
It says almost nothing to suggest that the best way to overcome 
public apathy is to convert disinterest into interest. But in the 
redistricting context, what this conversion requires is something other 
than just a typical information campaign intended to capture public 
attention and sway public opinion to get voters to support a reform 
 
 91. Joshua Fougere, Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Partisanship, Public 
Opinion and Redistricting (January 2010) (manuscript on file with Duke Journal of 
Constitutional Law & Public Policy). 
 92. Id. at 33.  Their study included a Pew Research Center survey in which a majority of 
respondents knew nothing about the redistricting issue. Id. at 6 (citing Press Release, Pew 
Research Center for the People and the Press, Most Have Heard Little or Nothing About 
Redistricting Debate: Lack of Competition in Elections Fails to Stir Public (Oct. 27, 2006), 
available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/294.pdf). 
 93. See Midwest Democracy Network, Midwestern Attitudes on Political Reform, June 
2008,  http://midwestdemocracynetwork.org/files/pdf/Five_State_2008_PollReport.pdf. 
 94. See Danny Yadron, Heart of Reform is in Drawing Political Maps, Not Finance, Some 
Say, MEDILL REPORTS - CHICAGO, Oct. 14, 2009, available at news.medill.northwestern.edu/ 
chicago/news.aspx?id=142273 (discussing public response to redistricting in Springfield, Ill.). 
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measure on Election Day. Instead, the development of public concern 
about redistricting should occur through a grass-roots mobilization 
that, long before an initiative measure is on the ballot, invites voters 
to consider how redistricting ideally should occur, and to play an 
active part in developing that process. Even if it involves only a tiny 
sample of the general public, as for instance with a citizen jury or 
assembly, the opportunity for public participation in the design, rather 
than just the approval, of a redistricting institution could substantially 
increase the salience of the issue to the public at large. This early 
public engagement then could help to energize and inform other 
citizens as a subsequent initiative campaign unfolds. 
Something like the Ohio Redistricting Competition, or the similar 
open source mapmaking software project that Micah Altman and 
others have been developing for application nationwide,95 could offer 
one option to meaningfully increase public participation in the 
redistricting process. Open source mapmaking could prove especially 
useful if public participation is encouraged and fostered in the design 
of the competition and the choice of substantive criteria by which 
proposed maps are judged. Another variant of a more participatory 
redistricting reform project is outlined below, this one involving a 
citizen-based mediation among interested stakeholders at the design 
stage of the reform process. But first one additional note is in order, 
about the ripeness of this moment for a grassroots, high-salience 
rethinking of the redistricting process. 
Today there is no shortage of public cynicism and distrust about 
government generally. Even if very little of this cynicism currently is 
directed specifically at the redistricting process, it is there to be 
harnessed by the right confluence of mobilizing strategies. The past 
two decades have witnessed a continuing battle over the structure of 
the American political system, involving such issues as legislative term 
limits, lobbying reform, campaign finance regulation, and matters of 
election administration. In all cases, even though at stake are 
fundamental issues about representative government and distortions 
thereto, the public has primarily been involved only by either voting 
up or down on a state ballot measure, or spectating as reform 
proposals move through self-interested state legislatures and 
Congress. Redistricting reform now offers the public an opportunity 
to take a different and much more active role in leading this 
 
 95. Altman & McDonald, supra note 82. 
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continuing battle over the essence of representative democracy. 
B. Overcoming Public Skepticism: California and Ohio Revisited 
Although currently apathetic about redistricting reform generally, 
the public has a much stronger position on accountability. Opponents 
of redistricting reform therefore have had an easy target when the 
centerpiece of a reform proposal has been an independent 
commission. As previously described, a majority party’s well-funded 
opposition campaign can easily exploit this public skepticism about 
elite institutional solutions. 
Here, then, the challenge is to structure a reform that removes the 
partisan gamesmanship from redistricting yet still satisfies the voters’ 
demand for accountability. But accountability does not have to 
require a partisan institution with members subject to electoral 
control. Instead, a reform measure can offer the public a form of 
direct accountability, by putting voters, rather than perceived elites, in 
charge. A redistricting reform process structured to serve this end 
could substantially undercut opponents’ abilities to poison public 
support for it by labeling it unaccountable. 
In significant part, this may help explain the success of California’s 
2008 initiative, and the failure of the 2005 efforts in both California 
and Ohio. As previously observed, in both states the 2005 opposition 
campaigns drove stakes through the reform efforts with heavy 
advertising campaigns warning against transferring redistricting 
authority to unaccountable panels of experts.96 Moreover, public fears 
of unaccountable institutions are only heightened when the coalition 
proposing the reform is not sufficiently broad-based, as was certainly 
true in 2005 of both Reform Ohio Now and Proposition 77. Each of 
these coalitions lacked minority support and, consequently, faced 
opposition from a variety of groups and organizations. 
In 2008, in contrast, Proposition 11 called for the creation of a 
citizens’ commission, consisting of fourteen members selected 
through an application process open to California voters generally. 
While admittedly not the only factor that may explain the success of 
Proposition 11 (the state budget crisis obviously played a substantial 
role), capitalizing on public participation in this fashion undoubtedly 
shifted the terrain on which opponents of the measure had to try to 
 
 96. Supra notes 15–20, 31–36 and accompanying text. 
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fight. Although this unelected commission is not electorally 
accountable, it is a citizen panel, rather than an elite panel, intended 
to be broadly representative of and responsive to California’s diverse 
citizenry. 
C. Another Model: The Joyce Foundation Campaign for Accountable 
Redistricting 
The prospects of bringing a redistricting reform effort to fruition 
are dramatically enhanced when the accountability issue is defused 
and the public is energized. Both goals can be accomplished through a 
broadly participatory, citizen-based reform process. The Joyce 
Foundation is now in the midst of a two-year campaign for 
“Accountable Redistricting,” intended to advance a version of just 
this approach by developing the “most democratic and participatory” 
redistricting reform movement yet.97 Though this project also 
encompasses media engagement and public education efforts 
intended to pave the way for reform, at its core are citizen 
redistricting commissions and an open source mapping project. 
Partnering with Professor Gerken and several members of the 
Election Law @ Moritz team at The Ohio State University (not 
including the author of this essay), the campaign is developing the 
citizen commission component of the project with several unique 
features. One feature is to fully create in one or two states, before the 
2011 redistricting cycle is underway, some version of a purely advisory 
citizen commission to act as a model redistricting body.98 This body 
would produce its own hypothetical legislative maps for public 
comparison with the official maps to be created by the state’s existing 
redistricting institution. Both the process by which this unofficial body 
produces its maps, and the resulting maps themselves, could have a 
substantial impact on the work of the official redistricting body in the 
2011 cycle. Moreover, in the long term this “model commission” 
experiment could offer an attractive alternative for states to adopt as 
 
 97. The Joyce Foundation, Campaign for Accountable Redistricting: A Strategic Blueprint 
for Midwest States, at 2 (Nov. 2009). 
 98. In 2008, Ned Foley and Election Law @ Moritz, in partnership with the AEI-Brookings 
Election Reform Project and Georgetown Law School’s Supreme Court Institute, undertook a 
similar model project, to explore how to minimize partisan influences in a different aspect of the 
American election system, namely the resolution of post-election disputes. The project involved 
a special tribunal’s resolution of a simulated election contest. For more details, see McCain v. 
Obama: A U.S. Supreme Court Hypothetical (One Hopes), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/ 
electionlaw/electioncourt/index (last visited Apr. 14, 2010). 
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their official redistricting process for the 2021 redistricting cycle. 
Broad participation is key to the success of this approach. To that 
end, another unique feature of the Joyce campaign is a “public 
mediation” process for creating the citizen commission. Participants 
are now at work in planning for the creation of a model commission 
in Ohio and Illinois by identifying a diverse and extensive set of 
stakeholders, and developing a consensus-based process for these 
stakeholders collaboratively to design a citizen commission. Engaging 
stakeholders and the public in this process serves to “inoculate”99 the 
effort against the risk that it will be too detached from political 
realities. 
Furthermore, a collaborative citizen commission like that under 
development through the Joyce campaign could build into it some 
ongoing flexibility to revisit the criteria deemed important to an 
“apolitical” redistricting process. For instance, if a preference for 
competitive districts in one round of redistricting proves in fact to 
leave too many voters disaffected, as some have cautioned it will,100 
the citizen commission could return to the conference table in 
advance of the next decade’s round of redistricting to reflect upon 
whether to adjust the set of mapmaking criteria. In some instances, 
states might allow the commission to make only an advisory 
recommendation that the legislature alter a set of statutory criteria. 
Alternatively, some measure of discretion could be lodged in the 
citizen commission to itself make such a change, perhaps with a 
supermajority voting requirement, or simply to decide round-by-
round which criteria to favor or how to weight them. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current partisan excesses in redistricting in the United States 
may partially be the result of the historical blind spot about how 
completely two parties would dominate American politics. Absent this 
feature, redistricting by legislative bodies might not be so distorted. 
Had this development been anticipated, an alternative redistricting 
process might have been implemented from the outset, as has been 
done in most other democracies around the globe.101 But the 
 
 99. Gerken, supra note 72, at 185. 
 100. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 101. See ACE Project, Structure and Rules for Delimiting Electoral Districts, 
http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/bd/bdb (last visited Apr. 28, 2010). 
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unanticipated rise and entrenchment of the two-party system does not 
need to leave citizens at the mercy of legislators who effectively 
choose who their constituents will be. 
Recent reform developments in both California and Ohio are but 
a small part of the movement to separate control of the redistricting 
process from self-interested legislators and political parties. But this 
movement continually runs up against the problem of mobilizing 
sufficient support among a public wary of turning over a core function 
of our democracy to unaccountable elites. There is, nevertheless, 
reason to hope that in coming decades both substantive and 
procedural reforms can take root that will provide the redistricting 
process with greater independence from partisan politics. 
These reforms will almost certainly begin in states with a popular 
initiative, where a broadly participatory, citizen-focused approach will 
maximize their prospects for success. In one sense it is hard to say that 
such a citizen effort would be “apolitical”—indeed, one of its 
advantages is that it involves the public at large in core policy 
questions. But this process would be distinctly different from the 
partisan manipulation that so obviously affects most redistricting 
today. 
Thus, although redistricting may be an inherently political affair, 
gerrymandering need not be a part of it.102 Rather, with increased 
public involvement in a redistricting process that the people 
themselves design and desire, we could replace the non-
representation-reinforcing gerrymander endemic today with a benign 
act of line-drawing, intended to promote whatever “political” ends the 
citizens have chosen, be it intra-district competition, overall political 
fairness, or even blind redistricting. While this essay has not attempted 
to design the details of a broadly participatory redistricting reform 
process, in describing why such a process has the best chance of 
success it seeks to encourage efforts to increase public involvement in 
redistricting. Although it is still too early to assess the impact of 
California’s Citizen Redistricting Commission, the Ohio Redistricting 
Competition, or The Joyce Foundation’s Campaign for Accountable 
Redistricting, these efforts are only three of many possible ways to 
 
 102. Here again, the term “gerrymandering” (a term potentially as ambiguous as 
“apolitical”) is defined to mean manipulation of district lines for partisan or incumbent-
protection ends, and not just any line drawing that deliberately advances the policy preferences 
of those responsible. 
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jointly increase voter salience about redistricting reform while 
satisfying the popular demand for public accountability in 
redistricting. 
 
